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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH# 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
KENNETH JAMES MORRELL, Case No. 890031-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant relies on his opening brief, and refers this 
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues, 
the case, and the facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The facts underlying an unrelated robbery have no 
bearing on Appellant's intent during the encounter between 
Appellant and Mr. Moor. The prejudicial impact of the admission 
of the facts underlying an unrelated robbery and additional 
evidence admitted to prove Appellant's guilt by focusing on 
criminal character require reversal of Appellant's conviction. 
Whether the right is of constitutional or statutory 
origin, Appellant's right to present a defense was violated by 
the trial court's barring cross-examination bearing directly on 
Appellant's defense and the credibility of the adverse witness, 
Mr. Moor. The prejudice resulting from this violation or "abuse 
of discretion" requires reversal. 
The trial court's ruling admitting evidence concerning 
Appellant's post-arrest pre-Miranda silence was incorrect. The 
1 
State's provision of a new basis for the admission of this 
evidence (Fletcher v. Weir) also fails because, even if Fletcher 
v. Weir were applicable in Utah, it does not support the 
admission of the evidence in this case. The sole purpose in 
admitting this improper evidence was to lead the jurors to infer 
Appellant's guilt. That purpose was improper; the impact was 
prejudicial; reversal is required. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE ROBBERY OF PAUL CHRISTENSEN 
HAD NO BEARING ON APPELLANT'S INTENT 
DURING THE ENCOUNTER WITH MR. MOOR. 
As noted in Point III of Appellant's opening brief, 
when the trial court allowed into evidence the facts underlying 
Appellant's guilty plea to an unrelated robbery, the trial court 
violated numerous rules of evidence: Rule 609 (a guilty plea 
prior to sentencing is not a conviction under the rule; robbery 
is not per se a crimen falsi; the facts underlying the conviction 
are not admissible under the rule); Rule 404 (evidence is not 
admissible to prove criminal propensity); Rule 403 (when the 
prejudicial impact of evidence outweighs its probative value, the 
evidence is excluded). Focusing on the trial court's failure to 
properly analyze the robbery of Paul Christensen under the test 
applicable under Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1)# the State 
concedes that admission of the robbery was error under that rule. 
Appellee's Brief at 33. 
The State maintains/ however, that the facts of the 
robbery of Mr. Christensen were admissible under Rule of Evidence 
2 
404, as proof of Appellant's intent. 
Contrary to the facts in this case, intent was in issue 
in State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 1987). While 
Appellant claimed no misunderstanding of the encounter with Mr. 
Moor in the instant case, Mr. DeAlo, charged with possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine, claimed that he was unaware of the 
cocaine hidden in his vehicle. Icl. at 196. As evidence of Mr. 
DeAlo1s intent to possess and distribute the cocaine, the trial 
court admitted evidence relating to Mr. DeAlo's apparent 
involvement in a large cocaine distribution scheme in California 
(a search warrant, supporting affidavit, and dope ledger). Id. 
at 198. Although Mr. DeAlo1s intent was disputed in that case, 
this Court explained that the evidence of the California scheme 
was not relevant to Mr. DeAlo's intent involved in the cocaine 
seized in Utah: 
Assuming the documents were introduced to 
prove defendant's intent to distribute a 
controlled substance, we must examine whether 
the documents had any tendency to prove that 
intent. Neither the affidavit nor warrant 
make any statements even remotely related to 
the seizure of the cocaine in Utah.... 
The probative value of the dope ledger 
is also questionable. The prosecution 
admitted that the names, codes, and dates on 
the dope ledger bore no relation to the 
cocaine seized in Utah. The prosecution 
claimed, however, the ledger demonstrated 
defendant's knowledge of and intent to 
participate in a major cocaine distribution 
scheme. Even assuming the ledger 
demonstrated those facts, it still was not 
connected to the cocaine seized in Utah. 
The marginal probative value of this 
evidence was overwhelmingly outweighed by the 
probability of unfair prejudice and confusion 
of the issues submitted to the jury, and its 
3 
admission clearly affected the substantial 
rights of the defendant. 
Id. at 199. 
Even if intent were in issue in this case, Appellant's 
robbery of Mr. Christensen had no bearing on his "intent" during 
the encounter with Mr. Moor. Rather, the evidence must have led 
the jurors to the desired conclusion: Appellant robbed Mr. Moor 
because it was his habit to rob pizza delivery people. The 
admission of the evidence violated Rules of Evidence 404 and 403, 
and resulted in Appellant's conviction, which must be reversed. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S PREVENTION OF 
THE PRESENTATION OF APPELLANT'S DEFENSE 
THROUGH CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MR. MOOR 
REQUIRES REVERSAL. 
As explained in Point I of Appellant's opening brief, 
1 The State disavowed any claim that the evidence was 
admissible to demonstrate modus operandi. M.H. 27. Indeed, it 
was not. See Appellant's opening brief at pages 30-32. 
That being the case, what was the function of the 
hearsay evidence presented through Officer Wayment that the 
telephone used to call Mr. Christensen to the scene of the 
robbery, like the telephone used to call Mr. Moor to the scene of 
the encounter with Appellant, was not located at the address 
given by the telephone caller (T. 2 81-82, 84)? To inform the 
jurors once again that the robbery of Mr. Christensen was so 
similar to the facts alleged by Mr. Moor, that Appellant must 
have robbed Mr. Moor. 
Appellant maintains that this evidence was improperly 
admitted, for several reasons. See T.2 81-85 (attached as 
appendix 1), where defense counsel objected to Officer Wayment's 
testimony concerning the telephone calls involving both the 
Christensen robbery and the Moor incident (£f. brief of Appellee 
at 15, contending that the facts concerning the Moor telephone 
call were not objected to), on the grounds of hearsay, lack of 
foundation, and lack of relevance. See also pages 10-12 of 
Appellant's opening brief, containing the "specious" 
confrontation clause argument, absurdly contending that the 
reliability of the evidence is a pertinent concern. 
4 
the trial court violated Appellant's right to confrontation when 
it blocked Appellant from asking the State's main witness 
questions relating directly to Appellant's defense and to that 
witness's credibility. It was Appellant's defense to the 
robbery that he was collecting $45 owed him by Mr. Moor, for some 
marijuana Appellant sold Mr. Moor at a party. Defense counsel 
was not allowed to ask Mr. Moor if he may have engaged in the 
drug transaction with Appellant, but forgot it due to Mr. Moor's 
drug and/or alcohol use. See T. 43-44, in Appendix 2. 
The State argues that this Court should not address the 
violation of Appellant's right to confrontation because defense 
counsel did not inform the trial court of the constitutional 
issue. Appellee's brief at 19. The trial court never explained 
why he chose to block the questions asked by defense counsel 
2 (although there was a bench conference (T. 44)), and defense 
counsel never stated the obvious on the record: 
The right of an accused in a criminal 
trial to due process is, in essence, the 
right to a fair opportunity to defend 
against the State's accusations. The rights 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses and 
to call witnesses in one's own behalf have 
long been recognized as essential to due 
process. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the 
Court in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 92 
L.Ed. 682, 68 S.Ct. 299 (1948), identified 
these rights as among the minimum essentials 
of a fair trial. 
"A person's right to 
reasonable notice of a charge 
against him, and an opportunity to 
2 But see State v. Suarez, Case No. 880309-CA (filed May 
25, 1990), slip opinion at 3, n.3 (bench conferences should be 
recorded). 
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be heard in his defense - a right 
to his day in court - are basic in 
our system of jurisprudence; and 
these rights include, as a 
minimum, a right to examine the 
witnesses against him, to offer 
testimony, and to be represented by 
counsel." 
Chambers v, Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). 
Assuming that this Court agrees with the State, that 
the trial court was not aware of the legal doctrines governing 
its blocking of Appellant's defense, this Court must still 
reverse Appellant's conviction on simple evidentiary grounds. 
As explained in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 
(1973), when cross-examination is impeded, the "integrity of the 
fact-finding process" is called into question. Thus, prior to 
blocking cross-examination, a competing interest must justify 
the sacrifice of reliability. Id., at 295, citing Berger v. 
California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969). 
The competing interest posed by the State in the 
instant case is protecting Mr. Moor from embarrassment and 
harassment. Appellee's brief at 22. 
Weighing Mr. Moor's hypothetical discomfort (which is 
not apparent in the record) against Appellant's conviction (which 
resulted, in part, from his inability to present his defense), 
the trial court erred in blocking the cross-examination of Mr. 
Moor. See State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 
1977)(reversible error occurred under the old rules of evidence 
when the trial court prohibited cross-examination of state's 
witness relating to her drug use, which was relevant to her 
6 
credibility as a witness, and directly relevant to the defense). 
III. 
THE ADMISSION OF APPELLANT'S 
POST-ARREST, PRE-MIRANDA SILENCE 
REQUIRES REVERSAL. 
As explained in Point II of Appellant's opening brief, 
the trial court erred reversibly in admitting evidence that when 
Appellant was both in police custody and suspected of crime, 
prior to his receipt of Miranda warnings, Appellant was silent 
when the police questioned him. The State responds, arguing that 
Appellant was not entitled to a Miranda warning prior to 
questioning because he was not under arrest, but was merely an 
investigative detainee, and arguing that under Fletcher v. Weir, 
Appellant's "post-arrest" silence was admissible to impeach his 
3 
claim of innocence at trial. Appellee's brief at 24-31. 
A. APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO MIRANDA WARNINGS. 
The State contends that Officer Miller's question to 
Appellant, "What's going on here?", occurred during the 
investigation prior to Appellant's being considered a suspect. 
The State apparently assumes that the discussion with Mr. Moor 
(after which Appellant was considered a suspect) followed the 
question to Appellant. Appellee's brief at 28. Appellant 
contends that the question to Appellant followed the discussion 
with Mr. Moor. Appellant's opening brief at 16. 
This sequence of events is important because under the 
3 It is curious that for purposes of entitlement to 
Miranda warnings, Appellant was not under arrest, and yet 
his "post-arrest" silence was admissible for impeachment 
purposes. 
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Utah Constitution, if Appellant was restrained (the State 
concedes this) and suspected of crime, he was entitled to Miranda 
warnings. Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983). 
Officer Neeley1s testimony (in appendix 3) concerning 
the sequence of events surrounding Appellant's arrest, if read 
carefully, supports Appellant's assertion that he was a suspect 
prior to Officer Miller's question. While Officer Neeley claimed 
that at some point prior to her conclusion that Appellant was a 
suspect, he was an investigative detainee (T.2 11), this 
testimony does not contradict other evidence that the police 
considered Appellant a suspect prior to Officer Miller's 
question. 
Officer Neeley was called to the scene to investigate a 
fight and a missing pizza driver (T.2 8-9). It was immediately 
after Mr. Moor, "the victim", exited the restaurant that Officer 
Neeley considered Appellant a suspect, and she and Officer Miller 
took physical custody of Appellant from Mr. Ilov (T.2 9, 11). 
Prior to asking Appellant the question, the police stood on both 
sides of him, and held his arm behind his back (T.2 9, 10). It 
is unclear whether the officers' search of Appellant preceded the 
question (T.2 4). 
4 Also see T.2 6, where the prosecutor argued that 
Appellant was "detained as a suspect", but not formally 
arrested; California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 
(1983)("Although the circumstances of each case must certainly 
influence a determination of whether a suspect is "in custody" 
for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the ultimate 
inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint 
on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal 
arrest."). 
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The police apparently felt no need to take such 
"investigatory" actions against Mr. Ilov (who was holding 
Appellant over a mailbox when the police arrived) or Mr. Moor. 
The State's contention that the question, "What's going 
on here?" was not interrogation requiring Miranda warnings, but 
was merely an investigatory question, should be evaluated by 
reference to Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), where 
the Court explained the definition of "interrogation": 
That is to say, the term "interrogation" 
under Miranda refers not only to express 
questioning, but also to any words or actions 
on the part of the police (other than those 
normally attendant to arrest and custody) 
that the police should know are reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response 
from the suspect. The latter portion of this 
definition focuses primarily upon the 
perceptions of the suspect, rather than the 
intent of the police. This focus reflects 
the fact that the Miranda safeguards were 
designed to vest a suspect in custody with an 
added measure of protection against coercive 
police practices, without regard to objective 
proof of the underlying intent of the police. 
A practice that the police should know is 
reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating 
response from a suspect thus amounts to 
interrogation. But since the police surely 
cannot be held accountable for the 
unforeseeable results of their words or 
actions, the definition of interrogation can 
extend only to words or actions on the part 
of police officers that they should have 
known were reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response. 
Id. at 300-302 (emphasis original). 
Under the first prong of Innis, there were both express 
questioning ("What's going on?") and other actions by the police 
used to elicit a response (surrounding Appellant and holding his 
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arm behind his back). See Innis at 302. Under the second prong 
of Innisy the police should have known that the question was 
reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. See id. at 
303. 
In short, at the time that Officer Edwards asked 
Appellant what was going on, Appellant was physically restrained, 
a "suspect", subjected to interrogation, and entitled to a 
Miranda warning. Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 
1983)(decided under Utah Constitution); Rhode Island v. Innis, 
446 U.S. 291 (1980)(federal constitution). 
B. FLETCHER V. WEIR DOES NOT APPLY. 
Pursuant to its duty to promote justice, the State 
argues that under Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982)(per 
curiam), "post-arrest" silence is admissible to impeach a claim 
of innocence at trial. The argument must be rejected for two 
reasons. 
1. This theory was not raised below. 
The issue before the trial court was Appellant's 
entitlement to Miranda warnings: 
THE COURT: Do you agree with Ms. Loy 
that if, in fact, he had been detained and 
was held and knew he could not leave, that 
that would be tantamount at that point, 
subject to restraint as to require Miranda 
warning in regards to any statements that 
might be made. 
MR. REED: I believe that is an accurate 
statement of what the law requires. Your 
Honor. 
(T.2 7). 
The application of Weir and similar doctrines requires 
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foundation analysis that the trial court in the instant case 
never considered. State v. Nott, 669 P.2d 660, 671, 674-675 
(Kan. 1983)(prior to admitting evidence of prior silence, a trial 
court must determine if the silence can be construed as 
inconsistent with trial testimony). 
The Weir opinion is by no means accepted by all state 
courts as the governing standard, and had the prosecutor sought 
to rely on Weir, Appellant would have had the opportunity to 
address the application of that decision under the Utah 
Constitution. In the event that this Court finds Weir 
applicable, Appellant would like the opportunity for full 
briefing under the Utah Constitution. 
This Court should not address this argument because it 
was raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Talbot, 
Case No. 880342-CA (filed May 9, 1990), slip opinion at 3. 
2. Appellant's silence was consistent with his defense; it had no 
impeachment value. 
Evidence of post-arrest silence is not admissible to 
support an inference of guilt; rather, it is admissible solely to 
impeach an inconsistent claim (e.g. that a defendant had 
previously told his exculpatory version of the events to the 
police). E.g. State v. Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373, 375-376 (Utah 
5 See State v. Davis, 686 P.2d 1143 (Wash.App. 
1984)(criticizing Weir); Nelson v. State, 691 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 
App. 1984)(Fletcher v. Weir is rejected under state 
constitution). Also see State v. Nott, 669 P.2d 660 (Kan 
1983)(majority and dissenting opinion discuss confused federal 
interpretations of the right against self-incrimination and 
impeachment use of prior silence). 
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1982). Thus, prior to the admission of such evidence, a court 
must make a foundational inquiry to determine whether the 
evidence has impeachment value. State v. Nott, 669 P.2d 660, 
671, 674-675 (Kan. 1983). 
Appellant's silence has no impeachment value in this 
case. It is apparently the State's contention that Appellant, 
surrounded and held by police, should have responded to the 
question, "What's going on here?", by telling the officers the 
same exculpatory version of facts he told the jurors at trial, 
and that his failure to exculpate himself when the police asked 
him this question demonstrates that his defense was fabricated. 
Appellee's brief at 30-31. 
As if. 
"Gee Officers, I'm sure glad you showed up. 
I've been trying my best to collect the $45 
Mr. Moor owes me from a previous marijuana 
transaction, but he refuses to pay me in 
full, the little scamp. Can you help me 
out?" 
Appellant's silence was consistent with his defense. 
Because Appellant's silence had no impeachment value, it was not 
admissible under Fletcher v. Weir. 
The admission of this improper evidence was prejudicial 
and requires reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Appellant's conviction resulted from the 
improper admission of prejudicial evidence, this Court should 
reverse the conviction. 
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Respectfully submitted this 1990. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Officer Wayment's Testimony 
Concerning Telephone Calls in 
Moor Encounter and Christensen Robbery 
Q Whose case is that? 
A Assigned to me for follow-up. 
Q Have you done investigation in this case? 
A Yes. 
Q As part of your investigation, have you 
reviewed the police reports that were prepared in that 
case? 
A Yes. 
Q Tell us what is the basic nature of this case? 
A It was reported as a robbery. 
MS. LOY: Objection, Your Honor. I am not sure 
it is too general. 
THE COURT: Sustained, too general. 
Q (By Mr. Reed) With regard to this case, are you 
aware of any telephone numbers that were given to police 
officers with regard to information and phone calls made 
to Ambassador Pizza? 
A Yes. 
Q What phone number was given as part of that 
investigation? 
MS. LOY: Objection, hearsay. 
MR. REED: Your Honor, I think — 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Phone number that was given: 
532-8187. 
81 
Q (By Mr. Reed) Have you had an opportunity to 
further investigate the location of that phone, if it 
exists? 
A Yes. 
Q And where is that phone located? 
A It is located outside the Smith's Food Store at 
328 South 900 West. 
Q Is that the phone number that was given by the 
caller who gave the address of 313 Genessee? 
A Yes. 
Q Does that phone number, in fact, corns back to 
813 Genessee? 
A No. 
Q Have you reviewed any other oases with regard 
to similar types of instances? 
A Yes. 
MS. LOY: Objection, relevance. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q (By Mr. Reed) Have you reviewed reports in a' 
case involving a victim called Paul Christensen? 
A Yes. 
Q And as part of that review, were you able to 
obtain a telephone number that was used in that case? 
A Yes. 
Q And the telephone number used in that case, 
32 
could you tell us what thai: was? 
MS. LOY: Objection, lack of foundation, 
hearsay. 
THE COURT: Well, lay a foundation where he is 
getting that information from. 
Q (By Mr. Reed) From where did you obtain this 
information? 
A From the police report. 
Q Are those reports regularly prepared by 
officers in your office? 
A Yes. 
Q And is that part of your duties in your office? 
A Yes. 
Q And from that police report, what number did 
you obtain? 
MS. LOY: Objection, foundation and hearsay. 
'THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q (By Mr. Reed) What number did you obtain? 
A 466-0348. 
Q And have you further investigated the location 
of that number, if any? 
A That number comes back not located. 
Q And what does that mean? 
A There was no record of that phone number 
listed. 
83 
Q Did you, as a result of that investigate any 
other numbers? 
A Yes. 
0 What number did you investigate? 
A 466-0438. 
Q Why did you choose to investigate thai: number, 
as well? 
A The report previously mentioned referred that 
"he call was made in the area of 13th South and Sth East. 
Q Based upon that information', what if any 
investigation did you do? 
A I went to 13th South 9th East, to the 7-11, 
which is located on the northeast corner of thar 
intersection. There are two pay phones there. One 
number was 466-0438. 
Q How does that number differ from the first :ne? 
A It's just simply the four and the thre-r are 
reversed. 
Q Does the number 466-0348 come back to an 
address at 1127 South Windsor? 
A No. 
Q Have you done any further investigation at my 
request today in this case? 
A Yes. 
Q What investigation have you done? 
34 
A You requested me to go to the area of 2nd South 
*nd 3th East and determine if there was any phones at 
that location. 
Q Did you do so? 
A Yes. 
Q What did you find? 
A There was a drive-up phone booth accessible by 
car at the northeast: corner of 8th South — excuse me, 
8th East, 2nd South. 
MR. REED: Thank you. Mo further questions, 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
EY MS. LOY: 
Q Mr. Wayinent, were you involved initially in the 
follow-up investigation of the case involving 
Mr. Christensen? 
A No. 
"0 You only looked at that later? 
A Yes. 
Q Officer in this case, in your investigation of 
this robbery of Matthew Moor that has been alleged, did 
you have occasion to see any physical evidence? Have you 
reviewed any physical objects that have been indicated to 
you as evidence? 
A No. 
35 
APPENDIX 2 
Limited Cross-Examination 
of Mr. Moor 
A Scott Perry, no. 
Q You know any man named Scott who lives in the 
West Valley area? 
A No, I don't. 
Q Have you ever been to a party on the east side 
of Salt Lake in the area of Trolley Square where you 
might have met Mr. Morrell and don't remember 
specifically? 
A Well, there have been parties that I have been 
to where I don't remember anything. So, I don't know. I 
don't remember ever having seen Mr. Morrell, ever. 
Q When you say sometimes you don't remember 
anything after being to a party, would that be because of 
alcohol and drug use? 
MR. REED: Objection, Your Honor, I don't see 
where we are going with this. 
THE COURT: State the question again. 
MS. LOY: Would the reason he has stated that 
be because of alcohol and drug use? 
MR. REED: Object to the question. 
THE COURT: Objection sustained. 
Q (By Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, have you ever obtained 
marijuana from Ken Morrell? 
MR. REED: Objection, Your Honor. He has 
already said he doesn't know Mr. Morrell. 
43 
1 THE COURT: Sustained. 
2 Q (By Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, is it possible that you 
3 have met Mr. Morrell at a party and you do not know 
4 remember him, meeting him at a party because of some 
5 reason? 
6 MR. REED: Your Honor, this has been asked and 
7 answered. 
8 MS. LOY: This is in a different form. 
9 THE COURT: Overruled. I will let her pursue 
10 this more. 
11 MR. REED: May I reserve the objection? 
12 THE COURT: Make your objections as they appear 
13 on the record. 
14 Q (By Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, is it possible that you 
15 met Mr. Morrell at a party at some time in your past and 
16 do not know remember because you have for some reason not 
17 remembered what occurred at a-past party? 
18 I THE COURT: Wait a minute. Both of you 
19 approach the bench. 
20 (Off the record discussion between Court and 
21 counsel.) 
22 Q (By Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, you indicated you took 
23 some money out of your pocket and handed it to 
24 Mr. Morrell; is that right? 
25 A Yes. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Officer Neeley's Testimony 
Concerning Officer Neeley's 
Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Question 
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THE COURT: Let the record show the jury is in 
its place in the .jury box and we are ready to proceed. 
MS. LOY: Thank you. Your Honor. We would call 
Officer Meeley to the stand. 
OFFICER SUSAN NEELEY 
Called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, after 
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified 
as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. LOY: 
Q Officer, would you please state your full name 
for the record and spell your last name. 
A Susan Meeley, N-e-e-I-e-y. 
Q And where are you employed? 
A Salt Lake City Police Department. 
Q Were you employed there on September 4th of 
1988? 
A I was. 
Q On that date in the late evening or early 
morning hours of the next day, did you have occasion to 
be involved in an apprehension of Kenneth Morrell? 
A I did. 
Q And can you tell the jury where you went on 
1 
That duty0 
A Yes. I wenr TO approximately 190'" Jouth .:tate 
Street in front of the Sccnecutter. 
Q And when you arrived there, what iid you 
observe as far as Mr. Morreli and his position? 
A There was a witness that had him bent :ver. I 
believe it was a mailbox or something at about that 
height, with his arm behind his back, .just holding him. 
Q Was Mr. Morreli restrained? 
A Yes. 
Q Who else was present as far r.s law enforcement 
officers? 
A Officer Lynn Miller and I arrived about -he 
same time. 
0 And did anyone else arrive? 
A Shortly after, a couple of other officers 
arrived: Officers Aiired and Hendri::. 
Q Did you have occasion to search Mr. Worrell? 
A I did not sear?:: him. 
Q Did you have occasion to observe whether anyone 
else searched him? 
A Officer Miller had him pat down. 
0 Did you observe the patdcwn? 
A Yes. 
0 And where was that done? 
A In front of the Sconecutter. 
Q Did you see when that was cone \v. re.-ar.ion ~o 
your arrival? 
A It happened after Officers Allred. Hendri::, 
Miller and I had arrived. 
Q And had Mr. Worrell been taken awav from the 
mailbox area when the patdown was done? 
A I believe he was in front of my oar at that 
time. So, yes, he had been. 
Q And how much time had passed from when von 
arrived to the time of the patdown? 
A I can't recall. 
Q Was it pretty quick? 
A Yes, I would say so. 
Q And when you observed that patdown, did you 
observe any objects removed from Mr. Morrsil's person? 
A Not that I recall. 
0 Did you see any objects in zhe area of this 
apprehension? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you observe anyone else to have an object 
that they found in the investigation? 
A No. 
Q And did you participate in any further 
searches? 
3 
A No. 
'') Did you have occasion to interview Mr. I lev and 
Mr. Moor? 
A Yes, I talked to Mr. Moor. 
0 Did Mr. Moor indicate to you anything about 
what had occurred with the money that he alleged was 
taken from him? 
A After it was taken? 
Q Yes. 
A No, 1 am not aware of what happened t< T n 
money. 
MS. LOY: No further questions. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
3Y MR. REED: 
0 Officer Meeley, what is the purpose of a 
patdown? 
A To establish if the suspect, has any weapons. 
0 Is that done at the time of an arrest.? 
A No, not necessarily. It is done when we talk 
to anybody that we feel might be carrying a weapon. It 
is for the safety of the suspect plus ourselves. 
0 So, you are really not looking f:r anything? 
You are .just trying to make sure that the suspect has no 
weapons? 
A Right. 
0 Did you arrest Mr. Morreil in this case? 
A I did no:. 
Q Did you see Mr. Morreil be arrested? 
A Yes. 
0 And who arrested? 
A Officer Alired. 
Q And when did that occur in relationship to your 
arrival on the scene? 
A As far as time, I am not really sure. 
0 At anytime prior to Mr. Morreil'- arrest:, did 
me make any statements to you? 
MS. LOY: Objection, Your Honor, improper 
comment. 
THE COURT: Come to the bench. 
(Off the record discussion between Court and 
counsel.) 
THE COURT: We will have the bailiff rake the 
jury out to the jury room. Ladies and gentlemen, we have 
a little legal matter we have to discuss for a few 
moments. (Pause) 
Let the record show the jury has now left the 
courtroom. And, Ms. Ley. 
MS. LOY: Your Honor, my objection was stated, 
I believe, that the question asked for an improper 
comment upon my client's silence at the time he was in 
custody, although the answer ~f the officer was that he 
was net vet arrested. Her previous "estimcnv \nctiratec: 
that he was restrained by a civilian. ""hey arrived and 
^nen patted him down. It appears without further 
foundation that it was a comment upon his silence upon 
arrest, and that is why I am objecting. 
THE COURT: Mr. Reed. 
MR. REED: Your Honor, it is -he ::rri': 
position that the officer arrived pursuant to a call and 
was conducting an investigation and Mr. >*orreIi was 
detained as a suspect, but was not, in fact. ;r under !\nv 
legal pretense under arrest until the time that it was 
determined that he might have committed a felcny offense, 
and at the time the probable cause determination was made 
by the officer and Officer Allred made the arrest. It is 
the State's position that although no statements w^re 
made by Mr. Morreii "o any officer, that "hat _•? 
something that is admissible as evidence as ~^  what his 
state ~>f mind was at the rime of his arrest, and the 
absence of any explanation for his behavior, which is 
part of the contention of his defense that that was not a 
robbery: this was a collection of a debt. 
I think the officer's statement that no pre-
Miranda statements were made would be a relevant issue 
with regard to the defendant's state of mind. Would not 
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:e m violation cf his Fifth Menanient ngnt ~o regain 
-ilent. There was no prooab^e : ause to -rrest - le 
suspect until that determination was maae casea n»::n tie 
interview of tne witnesses at tne scene. 
THE COURT: Ms. lev. 
MS. L3Y: Your Honor. I think ^hat trerr.ars ~r.is 
ruling needs to be based in part upon further factual 
^ases. That would be wnether or not Mr. Morreil cas euer 
free to leave or wnether ne was restrained at a-. ~ lines 
"y ^ he ctficers. if ttiey ""ooi-i rusted'' t: Dm tr^ ~**ili?r 
and restrained his freedom to leave. Then, Z think he 
would be m custody and his custodial silence is 
something he has a right to have not commented ucrn. 
MR. REED: I think the statement. Your Honor, 
is something similar to the difference between stct ~nd 
frisk, or detention for purposes cf investigatirn. and a 
letention for purposes of arrest. at whi*-h ~ime ^ne Fifth 
Amendment attaches. 
THE COURT: Do you agree with Ms. Lev -.ct if. 
m fact, he had been detained and was held and knew he 
^ould not leave, that that would be tantamount at that 
point, subject + o restraint as tz require Miranda warning 
in regards to any statements that might be made. 
MR. REED: I believe that is an accurate 
statement of what the law requires. Your Honor. 
/ 
THE COURT: I don'- have enough informarion at 
this point. You will have to question tnis witness 
further in this regard without the jury here and let'3 
hear it. Find out exactly where he was and — 
0 (By Mr. Reed) Do you recall where you were when 
you got this call? 
A Where I was? 
Q Hh-huh. 
A Exactly, I don't recall. 
Q Ycu recall what hind of r notificatim vcu *"t 
and how you received that? 
A Yeah. The first call that came in there were 
two separate calls. The first call was that there waa a 
fight. I don't recall if it was in the Sconecutter cr 
.just in front of the Sconecutter. While I was en route 
the second call came in and said it was a pizza driver 
and so knowing that we had a pizza driver missing. 
assumed it was rhe ?ne that was missma. 
0 Was the pizza driver said to be at the same 
location as the fight? 
A Yes. 
Q When you arrived, tell us once again what you 
observed? 
A Okay. Mr. Morrell was bent over either a 
mailbox or something of that height in front of the 
Sconecutter. And Ivan, one of the witnesses, had one of 
his arms behind his back holding him r.here. 
Q Did you see any other persons in the immediate 
vicinity? 
A There was a cab driver standing r.here. Then 
when I arrived, the victim came out of the Sconecutter, 
along with some other people and I don't recall if there 
were two or one or even who they were. 
Q And did you take custody of Mr. Mcrreil at that 
:? 
A Officer Miller went to one side of him and I 
went to the other side. 
0 And where did you take him from? 
A We .just held him at that position. 
Q Did Mr. Ilov let go of him at that r.ime? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you advise Mr. Morrel'l of anything at that 
point? Did you say anything to him? 
A Mo. As I recall. Officer Miller asked him what 
was going on. 
0 Was there any response to that question? 
A No. 
Q Was there any other questions asked of him? 
A Not that I heard. 
Q And from that Location was Mr. Morrell taken by 
you anywhere else? 
A Mo. Officer Miller pretty rvuch hana-ed him a* 
"Hat point. 
Q Where was +*he defendant when he was arrested by 
Officer Allred? 
A I am not really sure. I know we took him. 
Officer Miller — I was talking to the victim. He was 
taken from the point where we released Ivan end he was 
Taken to the side of my car, to the front of IT. 
MR. REED: Very well. Your Kcncr, : -hink that 
is all I can estaolish with this officer. 
THE COURT: Ms. Loy. 
EXAMINATION 
3Y MS. LOY: 
Q Officer, was Mr. Morreil free to leave as you 
and Officer Miller stood there and Officer Miller asked 
what was going en? 
A Mo. 
Q How was he restrained? 
A He was just held there with his hand behind his 
back. 
Q Are you saying there was physical force holding 
him there? 
A Officer Miller was holding him, yes. 
Q Was he ever after that point released from 
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police custody? 
A No. 
MS. LOY: I have nothing further on that. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. REED: 
0 Do you have an opinion as to when he became a 
suspect in any criminal activity? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q When did that, occur? 
A He was a suspect when the victim came out of 
the Sconecutter and there was a little bit of 
conversation between he and myself. And I asked him if 
this was the suspect and he said yes. At that point he 
was in my eyes a suspect. 
Q And so, even though prior to that he was 
detained, he was not a suspect of any criminal activity? 
A Not at that point. 
Q How would you characterize that detention then? 
A Mainly because we didn't know what was going 
on. When someone is being held like that, we have to 
find out all of the facts. 
Q Was that done for the purposes of 
investigation? 
A Yes. 
Q Was it done to determine whether or not a crime 
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may nave been committed? 
A Yes. 
MR. REED: Nothing further. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I am going to allow up to that: 
point only, the question that was asked, ana I suspect 
the response will be silence. 
MR. REED: I anticipate it. That is correct. 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I will allow that. 
MS. ICY: Will the Court r.ote my objections, my 
continuing objection to that? 
THE COURT: Yes, you have already objected. It 
is on the record. Bring the jury back. 
(The jury was returned to the courtroom. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled and you 
may proceed. 
MR. REED: Your Honor, if I may withdraw -he 
previous question and lay some foundation. 
CROSS EXAMINATION CONTINUED 
3Y MR. REED: 
0 How long were you in the immediate presence zi 
Mr. Morrell? 
A Altogether, maybe 10, 15 minutes. 
Q And where did you first come into his presence? 
A In front of the Sconecutter on State Street. 
1 •? 
Q Was there anyone else there with you and ne? 
A Officer Miller. 
Q How long — Well, during the time that you were 
with Mr. Morreil at that point, did he make any 
statements to you about what had happened? 
A No. 
Q Was he asked what had happened? 
A Yes. Officer Miller asked him what was going 
on. There was no response. 
MR. REED: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Ms. Loy. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. LOY: 
Q Officer, when you first arrived and Mr. Ilov 
had Mr. Morreil by the mailbox, what is the first action 
the officers took toward Mr. Morreil? 
A Officer Miller went to one .^ ide and I went to. 
the other side. Officer Miller took the arm ^he witness 
had behind his back and kept him in that position. 
9 And from that point on, was Mr. Morreil being 
held by the police? 
A Yes. 
MS. LOY: Nothing further. 
MR. REED: No further questions, Your Honor, 
(Witness excused-) 
